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PROPERTY LAW
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
JAMES G. DWYER*
The three essays on property law focus primarily on its relation-
ship to the moral beliefs, attitudes, and experience of the average
person in society, rather than to moral theory. First, Merrill and
Smith argue for the proposition that a society's property laws "must
be regarded" as resting upon widely accepted moral principles that
are simple and that include recognition of moral rights with respect
to things.1 They see this proposition as at odds with the view "that
property is a pure creature of law" and with the modern utilitarian
approach to analyzing property, which is 'largely indifferent to
questions of individual rights and distributive justice."2 And they
view the proposition, once established, as a basis for critiquing the
"bundle of sticks" conception of property rights and the Coasean
postulate of reciprocal causation, because those ideas are too
complex and/or counter intuitive for the average person.'
A basic ambiguity in Merrill and Smith's thesis makes it difficult
to assess the success of their arguments. It is unclear whether they
claim (1) that the best theoretical justification for a property law
regime must consist of simple moral precepts, or (2) that property
law must coincide with and be understood by the average person in
terms of some simple moral beliefs. The first would be a claim about
the relationship between moral theory and property law, whereas
* Professor of Law, College of William & Mary.
1. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1849, 1850 (2007).
2. Id. at 1849.
3. Id. at 1860-66.
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the second would be a sociological claim about the relationship
between popular moral beliefs and popular support for and adher-
ence to property laws. Language in their essay suggests the authors
are making both claims.4 Their argument at best supports only
claim #2, however, because it rests entirely on empirical assump-
tions about the average person's views about property rights and the
average person's willingness to obey the law. Merrill and Smith
offer no basis for unifying the two-that is, for concluding that the
best theoretical justification for property laws is whatever set of
moral propositions the average person will accept and act upon. Yet
until they provide a compelling argument for claim #1, they will not
have provided a basis for criticizing theorists who use the bundle-of-
sticks metaphor or Coasean theory in presenting theoretical
normative arguments for or against particular property rules.
In addition, their case for claim #2 is not entirely convincing.
They are quick to assume that the bundle-of-sticks and reciprocal
causation concepts are entirely foreign to the average person, but
certainly many counter examples could be cited. Further, though
they devote much space to establishing that property laws must
embody or rest upon simple norms-for example, that theft is wrong
and that ownership entails the right to exclude, they make little
effort to establish that those norms must be moral rather than
(only) legal. In fact, the examples just cited are legal norms: stealing
is a legal wrong and legal ownership entails a legal right to exclude.
It might well be that widespread belief in moral property rights
generates greater compliance with legal property rules than would
the legal rules standing alone, but the authors would need to do
more to demonstrate that such widespread moral beliefs are
indispensable, that without them chaos would prevail. Moreover,
even if one could demonstrate that, it might nevertheless be the
case that property is, as an historical matter, a legal invention, a
"creature of law," around which popular moral beliefs have over
time coalesced, in the way that David Hume described.'
Carol Rose offers a "best of all possible worlds" apologia for
property law as we know it. She engagingly illustrates how several
aspects of property law-rules regarding initial acquisition,
4. See, e.g., id. at 1877, 1889.
5. Cf. id. at 1849, 1857 n.19.
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distribution, and commodification-reflect what some might see as
a second-best morality, one that accommodates human fallenness
while still assuming or demanding some moral behavior on the part
of a society's members, striking a balance between self-interest and
cooperativeness.6
Like Merrill and Smith, Professor Rose perceives a need for
certain moral attitudes to prevail in a society in order to ensure
sufficient compliance with property laws, but she also contends that
we could not do better by trying to move the law substantially in the
direction of assuming more moralistic and less self-interested
behavior on the part of the average person-that is, toward utopian
or communistic ideals.7 This sort of realist resignation is routinely
force-fed to first-year law students, and it is difficult to contest;
indeed one wonders whether it is practically nonfalsifiable. Are
references to particular past, supposedly failed utopian experiments
sufficient to demonstrate that the law could not or should not be
changed to demand or assume greater community spiritedness? Or
are such past experiments too few and too complex to support
definite conclusions? One wonders as well whether Rose's equilib-
rium theory has any basis for critiquing particular existing laws; or
does a law's very existence manifest that it reflects an optimal
balance between allowing pursuit of self-interest and demanding
cooperation?
Emily Sherwin is less sanguine about existing property law
regimes, contending that they inevitably generate substantial moral
unease, though she does not suggest that this unease can be
eliminated.8 Professor Sherwin points out that not only the public
moral justifications of property laws, but also the laws themselves,
must be relatively simple, and that this gives rise to moral disquiet,
because some particular cases decided under a rule will not fit its
underlying moral assumptions.9 Moral unease also arises from
conflict between the desire to correct past wrongs and the need for
stability in arrangements once established, as well as from disso-
6. See Carol M. Rose, The Moral Subject of Property, 48 WM. &MARY L. REV. 1897 (2007).
7. See id. at 1925-26.
8. See Emily Sherwin, Three Reasons Why Even Good Property Rights Cause Moral
Anxiety, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1927 passim (2007).
9. See id. at 1950-51.
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nance among the dictates of retributive, corrective, and distributive
justice. Sherwin claims that these sources of moral anxiety,
although not unique to property rights, are more pronounced in this
area. 10 She does not discuss other types of rights, however; in
particular, she does not consider whether similar problems arise in
connection with rights to freedom or political participation. Thus,
more work would be needed to show that her points in fact say
something distinctive about property law, but they are interesting
points nonetheless.
10. See id. at 1951.
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